December 17, 2018

Dr. Ruth Watkins
President
University of Utah Office of the President
201 South Presidents Circle
Salt Lake City, Utah 84112

Re: Report of Independent Review of the Actions of the University of Utah Department of Public Safety in the Lauren McCluskey Case

Dear President Watkins:

On October 30, 2018, you tasked the undersigned with conducting an independent review of safety on the campus of the University. Specifically, and the subject of this review, is a focus on the actions of the University of Utah Department of Public Safety in the Lauren McCluskey case. Accordingly, you gave us specific direction to look at Department policies, protocols, procedures and actions of all officers who were involved in the case, and not being limited to what may be typical and/or established practices. In addition, you asked us to provide you with our findings regarding improved and enhanced practices and procedures that may prevent or lessen the probability of such a tragedy occurring again.

Attached to this letter is our report regarding the actions of the University Department of Public Safety and its personnel. We also include the results of our review of the University’s Department of Housing and Residential Education as those findings were relevant to the overall Public Safety review. Also included are some findings and suggestions regarding other University entities and how they might better react and coordinate to improve campus safety. These findings will also form a part of the later review of overall campus safety.

Thank you for the privilege to be of service to the University in this most important endeavor. We have been constantly mindful of the pain this matter has caused you and the University and especially the family of Lauren McCluskey. We hope this report does justice to the task you asked of us.

Sincerely,

John T. Nielsen

Sue Riseling

Keith Squires
INDEPENDENT REVIEW AND REPORT INVOLVING THE CONDUCT AND ACTIONS
OF THE UNIVERSITY OF UTAH DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY, AND HOUSING
AND RESIDENTIAL EDUCATION,
RELATING TO THE LAUREN McCUSKEY CASE

SUBMITTED BY:

John T. Nielsen
Sue Riseling
Keith Squires

December 17, 2018
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Pursuant to the charge given us by President Watkins this Executive Summary will briefly describe the independent review conducted into the actions of the University Department of Public Safety ("UUPS") and the Housing and Residential Education ("Housing"). The body of this report contains a more detailed explanation of our findings and recommendations for both Departments.

Department of Public Safety

Our review revealed several issues in the handling of Lauren McCluskey’s case. The most significant issues and recommendations include the following:

1. Melvin Shawn Rowland ("Rowland") was on parole for a previous felony violation. There was never an attempt by any of the officers involved to check his "offender status." Further, there were no policies or procedures that required such checks. In this case, a criminal history check was obtained, but it failed to include the fact that he was on parole. We, therefore, recommend that this omission be corrected by requiring an "offender information check" in every criminal case excepting the most routine police contacts.

2. Existing systems in place to flag "offender status" information when an officer runs a driver’s license check failed to work properly. We recommend that the University request the Department of Corrections determine why the systems failed.

3. UUPS is understaffed. Not only is this generally true with respect to the need for more patrol officers, but in addition, officers are needed who are specifically trained in the investigation of domestic violence cases including reports of harassment, stalking, and other forms of interpersonal violence. We recommend that UUPS undertake a resource study to determine its needs and that priority be given to hiring detectives trained in domestic violence and other forms of interpersonal violence.

4. UUPS does not have a coordinated working relationship with the Center for Student Wellness ("CSW") and its victim advocates. We recommend coordination efforts be implemented. We also recommend that UUPS
consider employing one or more “in house” advocates to assist officers in their investigations.

5. We recommended that UUPS needs to implement an effective training program dealing with interpersonal violence. Especially important is the need to incorporate the “Lethality Assessment Program” that is used in many police agencies around the State.

6. Most UUPS contacts with Lauren McCluskey (“Lauren”) were by phone or email. Except in the most routine matters, personal, face to face contact and interviews with individuals reporting concerns regarding interpersonal violence should be standard procedure.

7. An important email was sent to [REDACTED] on her day off. She did not read it until after the homicide had occurred. UUPS should adopt and implement policies to ensure that sensitive email and voice mail communications are handled in a timely manner.

8. We include other recommendations in the body of this report.

Department of Housing and Residential Education

While we were not originally tasked to review Housing issues, it became clear that there were a number of issues that were germane to our review of UUPS. Housing officials are often the first to discover and recognize that students may be in trouble. We identified a number of measures that we believe will help the University respond more effectively and immediately to interpersonal violence concerns. They are as follows:

1. Institutional structures at Housing prevented an early attempt to intervene when Lauren’s friends reported that they believed she was in an unhealthy relationship. The information was passed up the chain of command, but decisions and responses were delayed. We recommend that processes be implemented to more expeditiously respond to student issues.

2. The Behavioral Intervention Team (“BIT”) was never engaged, nor were any of the issues reported to the BIT coordinator for advice and/or action.
3. There was a report by Lauren’s friends that Rowland was considering bringing a firearm on campus to give to Lauren. This information was never communicated to UUPS or reported to BIT. We recommend policies be clarified or implemented to facilitate reports of firearms on campus to UUPS. Among other things, this would have allowed Rowland’s possession of a firearm in violation of his parole to have been reported. UUPS needed to know this information.

4. There was no investigation into reports by Lauren’s friends that Rowland was violating housing policy and had easy access to the housing unit. We recommend that policies be clarified or implemented to ensure appropriate oversight.

5. CSW victim advocates were not engaged to lend their advice and expertise when the information supplied by Lauren’s friends became known. We recommend policies or procedures be implemented to engage victim advocates when concerns of potential interpersonal violence are raised with Housing representatives.
PREFACE

On October 22, 2018 University of Utah student and athlete, Lauren McCluskey, was murdered by Melvin Shawn Rowland.

Lauren was 21 year old senior at the University when her life was taken. She was a successful student and athlete at the University of Utah. Lauren lived at Shoreline on the University campus. She had a strong group of friends, was well liked, and was kind, trusting and caring. Some viewed her as a bit shy and reserved. She had a strong bond with her family.

Rowland was 37 years old and a convicted sex offender who served over a decade in prison. By all accounts Rowland was a master con man. He manipulated people and events to benefit himself. He convinced most people that he was 28 years old, that he was a student, and that his name was Shawn Fields, all of which was fabricated.

It is clear Rowland manipulated and used Lauren to make money for himself. When she confronted him and his lies, he simply lied more through deceptive text messages and lies about being in an accident, about being in a hospital, dying, and about his own funeral. His final series of lies suggested both he and Lauren were the victims of extortion, while he was actually behind it. Rowland was controlling, manipulative, and coercive. When Lauren refused to go along with his manipulation and reported his actions to the police, he stalked her and killed her.
PURPOSE

This report outlines the actions and activities we have undertaken to review the conduct of UUPS and Housing regarding Lauren McCluskey.

This report begins with a description of the procedures and activities we undertook to arrive at our findings, conclusions, and recommendations. The bulk of the report consists of our review of UUPS. UUPS is responsible for all law enforcement services on campus. They responded to Lauren’s reports over a 12-day period following the break-up of her relationship with Rowland.

We also include a review of some aspects of the operation of Housing. Housing employees and professionals are often in the position to be the first to detect and/or recognize problematic issues involving student residents.

Finally, we recommend certain changes regarding UUPS generally, student and public safety on campus, threat assessment processes, and possible resource enhancements.

REVIEW PROCESS

The review began immediately following the press conference held on October 30, 2018. It included all relevant information that we could discover involving Lauren’s relationship with Rowland, her contacts (and those of Lauren’s mother) with Housing staff, the police, and the subsequent police extortion investigation. Our review did not include any determination as to the progress of the criminal investigations involving the extortion allegations.

All officers and department personnel who had any contact with Lauren or this case were interviewed. This included extensive discussions and interviews with Chief Dale Brophy and Assistant Chief Rick McLenon. Over 30 interviews were completed, and we conducted an examination of all relevant police reports, dispatch tapes, photographs, videos, documents, information submitted by Lauren McCluskey, organization charts, and policies and procedures of UUPS and Housing.

We also had several contacts with the Utah Department of Corrections and the Utah Department of Public Safety.
We also reviewed the goals and purpose of the Behavioral Intervention Team (BIT), the CARE Team at Housing, and the “Advocate” software or computer program utilized by the University. We also examined the role of the Center for Student Wellness Victim Advocacy program and University Counseling Center counselors.

The individuals interviewed by one or more of our review team appear in Appendix A of this report.

**TIMELINE AND FINDINGS**

In order to understand our examination of the conduct of UUPS and Housing we provide the following:

**Early September:** Lauren meets Rowland at the London Belle, a Salt Lake City bar, and begins a relationship with him for the better part of September.

**Mid-September:** Lauren goes pistol shooting with Rowland and his friends.

**Wednesday, September 26:** Lauren calls two of her friends and is very sad. Lauren says that Rowland will not let her “hang out with friends.” The friends feel Lauren does not sound right and they notice that week that Lauren’s physical appearance had begun to change. Both believe Lauren was too trusting and was being taken advantage of by Rowland. Neither likes Rowland because he just “didn’t ring true.”

**Sunday, September 30:**

- Lauren’s two friends meet with the Resident Assistant for Shoreline, [redacted]. They tell [redacted] that they are very concerned about Lauren, that she is in an unhealthy relationship with an older man who was controlling her and [redacted], and is practically living with her at Shoreline. They are also concerned that this man had been talking about getting Lauren a gun very soon. Because of their friendship, they wish to remain anonymous.

- [redacted] then calls the Area Coordinator, [redacted], to report information she had received from Lauren’s two friends.
advices that there will likely be follow-up with Lauren regarding the guest policy, and that should counsel Lauren about the implications of firearms on campus. She also advises to report this information to the CARE Team at Housing.

- states in writing what she had learned from Lauren’s friends. She states, “I was prepared to call [UUPS] and go to the apartment that night, but advised me to wait and talk about it the next day.” This statement was subsequently clarified to imply that if Rowland was present, she would call UUPS. also contacted , Resident Director, to relay the concerns that had been expressed to her by Lauren’s friends.

**Monday, October 1:** tells both and that something should be done immediately regarding Lauren’s situation. and recommend that a Housing CARE report be submitted. is unable to submit a report because the computerized reporting system called “Advocate” was down. No further action is taken at this time.

**Tuesday, October 2:**

- tells that she has now received information that Rowland might be and that she fears Lauren may be hurt. still believes that a CARE report is the appropriate course of action. No CARE referral is submitted at this time.

- contacts Assistant Director of Residential Education, , to inform her of the information she had received regarding Lauren’s relationship. At that time, believes that no Housing violations had occurred, except perhaps violation of the guest policy, and that Lauren is not seeking help herself. wants to discuss the matter with , Associate Director-Leadership Team. Apparently after discussion with , and agree to keep Lauren “on [Housing’s] radar.”

**Wednesday-Thursday, October 3, 4:** Lauren suspects that Rowland has a criminal record and is a registered sex offender. Additionally, she discovers his real age
and name. When she asks Rowland about this, he tells her he has “many identities.”

**Wednesday, October 3 through Monday, October 8:** [Name], [Name], and [Name], Assistant Director for Conduct Management, and perhaps others at Housing, conduct various reviews of Lauren’s situation. They decide not to “overstep” in assistance to Lauren unless she was seeking support; they also conclude, however, to raise the guest policy with Lauren as an appropriate way to approach her. There is some confusion about the source of the information about Lauren. [Name] is under the impression that it came from friends and is unaware that [Name] also knew Lauren.

**Friday, October 5 through Tuesday, October 9:** Lauren visits her family and friends in Pullman, Washington. She tells her friend, [Name], what she has discovered about Rowland.

**Monday, October 8:**

- A previously scheduled CARE meeting at Housing is cancelled.
- [Name] sends an email to [Name], indicating that she had been reviewing a CARE student with [Name] and that they are developing a follow-up plan. She includes in the email the information that she received from [Name], the actions [Name] had taken, and the advice given to [Name]: “The policy regarding firearms was reviewed and emphasized with [Name]. She was instructed that the instant there is knowledge of a gun on campus, she needed to be informing [UUPS] and Area duty.” [Name] states that [Name] had reviewed the matter with [Name] and suggested that [Name] should handle the outreach to Lauren given their friendship. [Name] attempts to contact [Name] but [Name] has left for Fall break.

**Tuesday, October 9:** Lauren returns to campus, contacts Rowland, and he comes to her room. As he approaches, he looks into the window before going to the front door. This action startles Lauren. She opens the door, confronts Rowland, and breaks off her relationship with him. She allows him to use her car, allegedly to run some errands. That same day Lauren receives a text from a friend of
Rowland’s informing her that she “had broken Rowland’s heart,” but that he would drop off the car. Other messages tell her to “go kill yourself.”

Wednesday, October 10:

- Rowland calls Lauren presumably to return the car.

- [Redacted] calls UUPS dispatch regarding her concerns that her daughter might be in danger and wants someone to go with her to pick up her car from an ex-boyfriend. [Redacted] informs the dispatcher that the ex-boyfriend is a sex offender. Tapes of the call reveal that [Redacted] is very upset and worried. A UUPS dispatcher calls Lauren and gives her several options for help in picking up her car. [Redacted] calls back to inform the dispatcher that a friend of Rowland’s will drop off the car. The dispatcher arranges to have a campus security officer pick Lauren up at her dorm and go with her to pick up the car. Lauren is picked up and transported to her car safely.

Thursday, October 11: Lauren receives text messages telling her Rowland has been in an accident and is in the hospital. Lauren texts [Redacted] in Washington several times about this news. [Redacted] was skeptical of the information, because Rowland does not own a car, he was supposed to be out of state, and the messages do not mention a specific hospital.

Friday October 12:

- Early in the morning, Lauren receives a text message that Rowland is dead. At 5:38 AM Lauren relays this news to [Redacted]. Again, [Redacted] is skeptical and points out the conflicting information to Lauren.

- Lauren calls UUPS dispatch to file a report. She states she is receiving texts about an ex-boyfriend and that his friends are trying to lure her away from campus and into a trap. The texts tell her that the ex-boyfriend is in the hospital and then dead, and mention a funeral. Officer [Redacted] takes a report over the phone. Lauren states that the texts are not threatening. [Redacted] tells Lauren that not much can be done if the messages do not contain threats, but to contact UUPS if things escalate.

Saturday, October 13:
- returns from Fall break and learns that Lauren had found out about Rowland's identity and had broken off her relationship. She is also told that UUPS is now involved. She had previously tried to contact Lauren but had been unsuccessful.

- Lauren calls dispatch wanting to speak with an officer in reference to a report she had made the day before.

- contacts Lauren by telephone. She tells him about the texts she had been receiving from her ex-boyfriend. mentions that the boyfriend was subsequently identified as Melvin Shawn Rowland. Lauren reports the extortion attempt asking for $1,000 and threatening that embarrassing photos of her would go viral if she does not pay.

- At 11:16 AM meets Lauren at the UUPS building where she shows him the transaction information regarding the $1,000 she sent through . has Lauren fill out a witness statement. During the interview, she also informs that she was scared when Rowland peeked through her window.

- joins and requests a criminal history check for Rowland from the dispatchers. The dispatchers run a criminal history and inadvertently click an “OTRK” transaction key to request correction information about Rowland. Neither , nor the dispatcher, however, recall observing any supervision status. It appears the only information given to and was criminal history of the sexual offense convictions.

- Officer contacts on-call Detective to report his contact and conversations with Lauren. instructs to forward his report, messages, and other communication to her office email. She tells him to have Lauren send screenshots of the messages and the transaction. tells that this conduct could be a scam or an extortion attempt by Rowland. contacts Officer and tells him to obtain further details regarding the reported extortion. also notifies her supervisor, Sgt., of this investigation.
- runs a check on Rowland’s name in the student database and he
sees a student with the name Shawn Rowland. Mistaking this student for
the person is checking up on, tells Lauren’s friend that
"Shawn seems like a good guy." Later realizes the record he was
looking at was not the person Lauren had a relationship with.

- At 1:05 PM Lauren leaves the UUPS building and sends several
screenshots. She tells him, “People are threatening to and blackmailing me.” One of the forwarded
messages states, “If you want to protect our image and dignity contact me.
Feel free to call the cops, that’s how including your family.” Lauren sends another message containing a
Lauren also sends
screenshots of the
information. forwards all this information
to work email account.

- At 4:14 PM and 4:33 PM, calls Lauren’s cell phone. She misses both
calls.

- At 4:41 PM, Lauren calls back. They briefly discuss the other items
needs.

- At 4:59 PM, 5:02 PM, and 5:11 PM, calls Lauren’s cell phone. She
misses the three calls, but Lauren returns calls at 5:24 PM and they
again briefly discuss information needed and the information being sent to
to send to .

- At 5:48 PM Lauren calls the Salt Lake City Police Department ("SLCPD")
dispatch. The call is transferred to UUPS dispatch and a UUPS officer is
assigned to follow up.

- Lauren calls her aunt, . During the conversation she tells
about the break-up with Rowland. Lauren mentions she has lost
the key to her dorm and was leaving the door unlocked or propped open.
She mentions she is alone because her roommate was away for the
weekend. Lauren tells she believes that Rowland is blackmailing
her.
Monday, October 15:

- Lauren sees her on-campus counselor.

- At 5:31 PM Lauren calls [redacted]. At 5:37 PM he calls her back but does not reach her. At 5:51 PM he tries again but still does not connect.

Tuesday, October 16 through Friday, October 19: [redacted] is engaged in various case assignments and follow-up investigations unrelated to Lauren’s case.

Thursday, October 18: [redacted] reviews an email sent to [redacted] by Lauren showing a photo of Rowland along with his driver’s license.

Friday, October 19:

- At 4:48 PM Lauren calls SLCPD dispatch and advises them that she is very concerned about her case because she has not heard back as to its disposition. She expresses concern that she believes there might be an “insider” within UUPS because her ex-boyfriend knows all about her contact with the police. Dispatch advises her to contact UUPS and speak with the detective or officer in charge of the case.

- [redacted] travels to the Salt Lake County District Attorney’s Office for work unrelated to Lauren’s case. While returning to her vehicle, she receives a call from [redacted] requesting her to contact Lauren.

- [redacted] contacts Lauren and provides her with her department email address and requests that Lauren forward all communications she had received as part of the investigation. Lauren offers that Rowland had [redacted]. Lauren tells [redacted] that she has no concern about contacting Rowland. [redacted] advises Lauren that she will be returning to work on October 23, and to contact UUPS dispatch if she receives any communication that appeared to be an attempt to lure her to some location.

- At 8:17 PM Lauren sends [redacted] an email with an attached screenshot that stated, “What did you tell the cops? We know everything!” Lauren seems concerned that they know everything about her involvement with “campus security.”
• At 9:56 PM  calls Lauren attempting to confirm that had spoken to Lauren earlier that evening. At 10:54 PM Lauren calls  and at 10:57 PM  calls Lauren back.

**Saturday, October 20:** Lauren sends an email to  containing three screenshots. One was a screenshot of a web page showing Rowland’s criminal history and his offender details.

**Monday, October 22:**

•  reports to CARE that she had not heard anything more about Lauren. This was the first Housing CARE meeting for some time because the meeting scheduled for October 8 had been cancelled. Apparently, no one at that meeting had any more information or updates on Lauren.

• At 10:39 AM Lauren sends  an email stating that she had received a text from someone claiming to be a UUPS officer. The email reports that the text states: “Good Morning Lauren. This is Deputy Chief McLennon with the University Police. I plan on calling you but I’m in a meeting at the moment. Can you come to the station as soon as possible. There is something you need to see. I will go over details when you get here. Thanks.”

• Lauren sees her on-campus counselor.

• At 10:00 AM Lauren calls  . The call lasts 40 seconds. Lauren again calls  at 11:55 AM, and this call lasts over a minute. Lauren places another call to  at 12:08 PM.  calls Lauren at 12:14 PM. Through these calls  learns Lauren received the fake text purportedly from the UUPS Deputy Chief earlier that morning. He recognizes it is fake because the sending number is incorrect. He tells Lauren not to answer the text, but does not report it to UUPS administration.

• That evening, Lauren’s father,  , calls with information about a possible abduction. It was later discovered that Lauren had been killed.  is called in despite being off duty. At the homicide scene,  logs into her department email and sees emails from Lauren regarding the fabricated message allegedly from McLennon.
ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Policing on a university campus is a distinct form of law enforcement. The environment and the constituency are different and the issues confronting young people on campus present diverse and complex challenges for the police. As we have conducted this review, we have attempted to be mindful of these distinctions.

Among other differences, UUPS is comprised of security officers and police officers. Security officers are unarmed and nonsworn employees who concern themselves with physical security tasks. In contrast, police officers are sworn, state certified, armed law enforcement officers, including investigators. Lauren McCluskey had contact with both security and the police at the University of Utah.

We reviewed UUPS department policies and protocols that were germane to this case. We have compared those policies to practices at other institutions within the field of university and general policing.

Just as policing is distinct on campus, housing young adults in residence halls also produces great challenges and holds many nuances. University Housing and Residential Education recognizes that 18-year old (and older) students are adults. Every effort is made to treat students as “adults,” to give them space, but at the same time to provide a home-like atmosphere. In so doing, there is a sense of caution that they not invade the student’s privacy by offering help and assistance when the student is not asking for it. In Lauren’s case, she was 21, a full adult by law, in an apparently consensual relationship.

Having in mind these distinctions of the campus environment and the timeline set out in the preceding section we make the following findings and recommendations:

1. There was never any report to UUPS or the BIT Coordinator that Rowland had been discussing bringing a gun on campus.

   Recommendation: The University should ensure that all campus community members know about BIT and the expectation to report threats or possible threats and the possible possession of weapons on campus, to the BIT team and to UUPS.
2. In light of state law permitting concealed weapons permit holders to carry guns on campus, University students and employees are confused about when to report the possibility of weapons being brought on campus. The advice given to [REDACTED] regarding what to do if there is evidence of the presence of such a firearm was in accord with University policy and state law.

**Recommendation:** UUPS should continue to take seriously reports of weapons, or the possibility of someone bringing a weapon, to campus. The University should provide additional training to employees about proper reporting of weapons or the possibility of weapons on campus.

3. In this case, after Housing chose not to report the possible possession of a weapon to the police, there was no report made to the BIT Coordinator.

**Recommendation:** In urgent cases where there is insufficient time to initiate a BIT referral, the possession of guns on campus should be reported to the BIT Coordinator and/or UUPS. The BIT Coordinator and UUPS can then assess the proper response to such a report.

4. The Resident Assistant could not get the central reporting mechanism “Advocate” software program to accept her CARE report.

**Recommendation:** The Advocate tool is robust; however, it needs to be updated periodically. There are also other tools and systems that have more features, especially when dealing with possible threats, not just disturbing behavior. The University should evaluate Advocate against other available programs to ensure they are keeping up with the best tools for the BIT’s use.

5. The reporting within Housing had multiple layers and the response took an extended period of time.

**Recommendation:** The University should streamline reporting processes within Housing.
6. In Lauren’s case, there were signs that she may have been in a coercive relationship. Housing did not conduct a meeting of its own to evaluate risk or whether the matter should be referred to BIT.

**Recommendation:** Whenever possible all involved and interested parties should meet together quickly to discuss cases that could escalate to interpersonal violence. Participants should discuss the issues, and designate a case manager and a strategy to move forward. Appropriate advocates and other campus resources should be engaged as soon as possible.

7. It was apparent to several students in the housing unit that Rowland was a non-student, was essentially living there, and could come and go as he pleased because he had befriended some of the residents.

**Recommendation:** The University should evaluate guest policies and enforce them.

8. In the newer dorms, the lower level is a common space with a “security” desk. However, in the older dorms, students live on the first floor.

**Recommendation:** Housing should evaluate current security policies and the University should consider modifying older dorms to provide some form of control as to who enters and leaves dorms in addition to the card-key access system in place in both older and newer dorms.

9. The phone call to UUPS dispatch on October 10 from Lauren’s mother concerned Lauren’s safety. We find the conduct of Dispatcher to have been appropriate.

**Recommendation:** UUPS should recognize Dispatcher proper handling of that call.

10. There is no mechanism to record and share routine security calls for service. The security escort of Lauren to retrieve her car on October 10th was not entered into the record management system. That information was not part of the record that police officers or detectives had access to.
Therefore, they did not know that Lauren and her mother felt that Lauren was in danger when she retrieved her car.

**Recommendation:** The University should evaluate the record management system to ensure security calls are recorded into a single system coordinating relevant security and police information and attaching to a single identifier, thereby allowing officers and detectives access to all information regarding victim, complainant, or suspect when needed.

11. No UUPS officer attempted to ascertain if Rowland was on parole. We believe the following helps explain why this information was not sought.

a. There is no requirement or protocol set out in UUPS policy that addresses parole status. In fact, no officer we interviewed had ever attempted to discover Corrections information during the course of their duties. Routine police encounters do not require the officer to obtain this type of information or a criminal history report. Given the serious nature of the allegations in this case, however, such checks seem appropriate and advisable.

**Recommendation:** UUPS should adopt and implement policy and procedure to require that criminal history and Corrections information be sought in every criminal investigation, and other matters beyond routine traffic stops.

b. No UUPS patrol officers interviewed were familiar with the process for obtaining online "Corrections Custody Information," in addition to general criminal background information.

**Recommendation:** All UUPS police personnel and dispatchers should be trained in all law enforcement databases available to them, including criminal histories and parole and probation information.

c. Two systems currently operating to assist officers in the field by alerting them if an individual is under the supervision of Adult Probation and Parole ("AP&P") failed to notify UUPS of Rowland’s status. The Public Safety Alert Notification System is administered by the Utah Department of Public Safety, and uses information provided
by the Utah Department of Corrections ("Corrections"). This system is triggered when an officer runs a driver's license check and is designed to notify AP&P if any individual under their supervision has contact with law enforcement. A second system is designed to provide an alert flag when an officer runs a driver's license check. This alert notifies the officer or dispatch that the person being checked is under the supervision of AP&P. We believe this second system failed to alert when the dispatcher ran a criminal history check on Rowland using his driver's license information.

**Recommendation:** The University should be advised as to why the system failed.

12. UUPS officers are concerned that any contact or inquiry regarding suspects they are investigating might trigger a premature response by AP&P and compromise their investigations.

**Recommendation:** Leaders from both UUPS and Corrections should meet to discuss mutual concerns and facilitate coordination and cooperation.

13. Each officer we interviewed repeatedly stressed that Lauren never expressed any fear of physical threat or violence from Rowland. In the first week of the extortion investigation, Rowland had convinced Lauren that he was also a victim and that they were in this together, and it appears that even she felt he posed no danger to her. Therefore, in the officers' view, Lauren's reports did not meet the statutory elements of domestic violence under Utah Code section 77-36-1 or Utah Code section 78B-7-102. The extortionate messages in this case, however, could be subtle evidence of possible dangers. These dangers may not have been recognized by others looking through an "extortion lens" only.

**Recommendation:** All UUPS police and dispatchers should be trained on the full array of domestic violence indicators to help officers respond appropriately.

**Recommendation:** The University should adopt and train UUPS officers and others in the "Lethality Assessment" recommended by
the Utah Domestic Violence Coalition, which focuses on the actions of the perpetrator and not on what the victim believes or perceives.

**Recommendation:** Leadership of UUPS should review current anti-domestic violence efforts. Several universities have a wide range of programs and approaches to address the issues of sexual and interpersonal violence in their many manifestations. Some relevant research is included in this report as Appendix B.

14. [Redacted] was placed in a position for which she lacked the expertise to recognize subtle indicators of domestic violence cases.

**Recommendations:** Some police departments have developed specialized units to deal with these cases utilizing highly trained officers to handle them when they are reported. The research accompanying this review is contained in Appendix B. Chief Brophy should determine how his department might benefit from one or more of the suggested approaches.

15. [Redacted] missed an additional opportunity to obtain Rowland’s Corrections information when UUPS learned of the extortionate text messages. The investigation regarding the extortion claims was not timely. Among other things, criminal history and Corrections information should have been sought by the detective in the early stages of the investigation.

**Recommendation:** See recommendations in paragraph 11.

16. [Redacted] made no phone, email, or in-person contact with Lauren until October 19.

**Recommendation:** UUPS should ensure that contact with a victim, in person if possible, occurs early in the investigation, even if only to inform the victim that there will be a delay due to other cases.

17. [Redacted] happened to be the on-call detective on October 13 when Lauren made the report to [Redacted] about the extortion. She was later assigned the case. Her normal schedule of work is Tuesday through Friday. This schedule resulted in three days where Lauren’s case was not worked because there was no recognized threat of violence.
Recommendation: UUPS should conduct a review of the on-call detective compensation, duties, and expectations.

Recommendation: UUPS should implement policies and procedures to ensure that detectives brief each other on their cases so that an on-call detective who is not the primary investigator is at least somewhat familiar with a situation if contacted. This briefing should include the detectives and sergeants.

Recommendation: UUPS should adopt and implement policies to ensure that sensitive email and voice mail communications are handled in a timely manner.

Recommendation: UUPS should direct that detective sergeants take a more active role in case assignment, prioritization, management and follow-up.

18. UUPS officers took Lauren’s complaints seriously. [Redacted] met with Lauren at the police department for an hour and a half. Additionally, [Redacted] gave Lauren her personal cell phone number and an extraction report of Lauren’s phone calls shows that there were 18 calls to and from officer [Redacted] between October 13 and October 22; at every opportunity he urged her to contact him if she had additional information or concerns.

It is possible that some actions by UUPS officers created an impression of laxity. That impression might have been formed because the interview and witness statements were done in the lobby of the UUPS building rather than in a room that would have been more private. A possible second concern was [Redacted] misidentification from the student database, and statement to Lauren’s friend that “Shawn seems like a good guy.” This was an unfortunate misunderstanding.

Recommendation: UUPS officers should not conduct interviews of victims in the lobby of the station.

19. There was no “insider” at UUPS providing case-related information to Rowland. In Lauren’s contact with SLCPD dispatch, she expressed concern that there might be an “insider” within the University police department
because she was receiving texts indicating that Rowland knew everything that she told the police.

In Lauren’s statement to the UUPS police, however, she wrote that in the course of their relationship she had given Rowland access to her computer and accounts. Therefore, Rowland was able to read every email she was sending to the police in real time.

**Recommendation:** The University should enhance its efforts to provide students and employees with information and assistance in protecting the integrity, confidentiality and privacy of electronic communications.

20. There was no report to the Office of Equal Opportunity and Affirmative Action. We found staff are confused about the reporting requirements.

**Recommendation:** The University should take steps to ensure proper training regarding interaction and communication with the Office of Equal Opportunity and Affirmative Action.

21. Virtually every contact by UUPS with Lauren occurred over the phone or by email. Other than the initial meeting with and there was never any face to face contact, including the follow-up investigation by .

**Recommendation:** Policy, procedures, and expectations should require, whenever possible, face to face meetings between the detective and a witness, victim, or concerned member of the public in response to a request for service, even if earlier face to face meetings have occurred.

22. UUPS could improve its relationship with the University’s CSW victim advocates.

**Recommendation:** The leaders from both organizations should meet, discuss mutual concerns, and ensure improved communication and cooperation.

23. UUPS does not currently employ victim advocates.
**Recommendation:** The University should support having an advocate within UUPS. The research accompanying this review found many university police departments have employed full time victim advocates. These advocates are in addition to others who may work for Student Wellness or at a Counseling Center. These advocates can be a tremendous resource to the investigating officer and can provide support to a victim as she or he progresses through the criminal justice system.

24. UUPS needs additional resources including staffing and expertise.

**Recommendation:** The University should conduct a staffing study, including salary information.

25. The State of Utah Public Safety Retirement System needs to be changed to encourage better recruitment and retention of qualified officers. This is especially acute in small departments like that of the University.

**Recommendation:** The University, working with the legislature, should attempt to modify state statutes to enhance the benefits given to law enforcement as was done in the past.

26. UUPS has policies regarding patrol procedures, domestic violence, investigation, and others. Current policies provided by Lexipol, however, lack specific campus information and do not recognize the nuances of university law enforcement to be completely effective.

**Recommendation:** UUPS should review and augment its policing policies to make them more applicable to campus policing.

27. UUPS is not accredited by an international or national accrediting agency or association.

**Recommendation:** UUPS should pursue accreditation.

28. UUPS headquarters is inadequate for current policing and security needs and is poorly located.
Recommendation: The University should conduct a space and work use study and consider a new location or a renovated facility.

29. Although the BIT has procedures, structure, membership, and experience and is a useful resource to handle threats, it was not used in this case.

Recommendation: The University should clarify its procedures regarding notification and engagement of BIT in appropriate circumstances.

30. The victim advocates at CSW were never engaged by UUPS or Housing.

Recommendation: Whenever possible, UUPS and Housing should involve the advocates so they can lend their experience, and give advice and support. These advocates can offer significant advice to administrators or direct assistance to students in a variety of ways including housing adjustments, safety plans, no-contact directives, and referral to other offices and/or the police.

ADDITIONAL CONCERNS

It is necessary to address some questions that have arisen regarding counselors in the University’s Counseling Center. We recognize that there is need for considerable privacy and confidentiality when a student seeks help from a therapist or counselor. We know from our review that Lauren had been seeing a University counselor. As a result, questions have been raised as to what Lauren might have told the counselor that could have been important regarding her relationship with Rowland and her safety.

We interviewed [REDACTED], the Counseling Center director, and were told that only information revealed during counseling that constitutes a threat to a person other than the person being counseled, needs to be reported to law enforcement. If the person being counseled reveals that she/he feels threatened, the counselor has no duty to report, but the person is counseled to report the threat to the police.

No one we interviewed at the University received any information from the Counseling Center or Lauren’s counselor. This is consistent with Counseling
Center policy. Therefore, our review was unable to ascertain what might have been relevant for the police to know.

We asked whether the counselor-patient privilege continues when the patient is deceased. The University’s legal counsel tells us the privilege continues even after death, based on professional ethical standards which are supported in state law. However, we believe other institutions of higher learning do not recognize this level of privilege once the individual is deceased. HIPAA in and of itself does not require protection of the privilege after death. We raise this issue only to suggest that this area may be appropriate for additional scrutiny when the next phase of the review of campus safety begins in 2019.

In addition, we recognize that Utah law involving concealed carry does not exempt state university campuses. We, however, recommend that the University always err on the side of safety and caution.

**SUMMARY**

We understand that this analysis is retrospective and it was important to us to be continually mindful of this fact as we discovered new information and pieced together the case after the outcome was known. Nevertheless, and notwithstanding the good faith of everyone involved, we believe there is much to be learned from this tragic situation.

Melvin Shawn Rowland was an evil, violent, manipulative, predatory sex offender who took the life of a promising young woman. He misled many people. He had multiple identities, plausible storylines, and charm. We know more now in hindsight than was known, and in some cases could have been known, at the time these events were occurring. We now see the links and connections, we now know his motivations and his intent, and we know the tragic outcome. We have based our findings on what was known, by whom, and when they knew it. We have based our recommendations on what we know now.

As we examined the totality of this troubling event, we discovered that there were several indications that Lauren McCluskey was in trouble. Had victim advocates been engaged, Lauren might not have been left to assess the dangerousness of her situation on her own. There were shortcomings both systemically and individually. There were several instances where the lack of coordination was evident within UUPS, within Housing, and among various
campus departments. While the University has developed systems and programs to respond to student welfare issues, those systems were not engaged nor utilized.

UUPS officers should have checked on Rowland's parole status. The UUPS detective involved in the investigation of Lauren's case should have ascertained his parole status when she had evidence that he was a convicted felon and the victim in her statement identified Rowland as a suspect.

Additionally, state systems to alert officers as to an offender's status with AP&P did not function as they were designed. UUPS seemed to lack the knowledge and awareness of these systems.

In the final analysis we will never know that this tragedy could have been prevented without these deficiencies. What we can say is that correcting the issues we have identified in this report might lessen the probability of such a tragedy occurring again. President Watkins has asked us not only to review but to recommend what the University and its Departments might do better in the future. We sincerely hope this report will be helpful to that end.

Respectively submitted,

John T. Nielsen
Sue Riseling
Keith Squires
Appendix A

Individuals Interviewed

University of Utah Department of Public Safety
Chief Dale Brophy
Deputy Chief Rick McLenon
Sgt.
Officer
Officer
Officer
Detective
Dispatcher
Dispatcher
Dispatcher

Housing and Residential Education

University Victim Advocates

University Counseling

Dean of Students
Lori McDonald
Students, friends, and associates of Lauren McCluskey

Family of Lauren McCluskey

Utah Domestic Violence Coalition
- Executive Director

Utah Department of Corrections

Utah Department of Public Safety
Appendix B

Resources and Training

The research was divided into three categories – programs, policy, and training – and the subsequent report follows this format. The universities surveyed or contacted include: Michigan State University, The University of Pennsylvania, The University of Iowa, The University of Florida, The University of Virginia, Yale University, The University of California Berkeley, The University of Massachusetts Amherst, Stanford University, The University of Connecticut, The University of Illinois, and The University of South Carolina Upstate. Additional contacts include consultant and law enforcement trainer Rebecca Dreke. Ms. Dreke’s prior experience comes from working several years at the National Center for Victims of Crime-Stalking Resource Center.

Programs

Recent high profiles cases and movements such as Know Your Title IX Rights and the Me Too Movement have brought significant focus on sexual assault, sexual misconduct, and interpersonal violence, including harassment, stalking, and domestic violence. Moreover, in the last five years the federal government has increased its oversight on college campus through the Department of Education via the “Dear Colleague” letter. The oversight and movements have prompted many campuses to review their responses, policies, and programs related to sexual and interpersonal violence. As might be expected, there are a wide range of programs and approaches at colleges and universities across the country. Within this section various components of innovative practices and programs are highlighted. Although not every approach is workable on every campus, some adaptation and implementation will certainly aid universities in establishing a highly effective response to these problems.

Special Victims Units

Most of the campuses reviewed had established a Special Victims Unit (“SVU”) within the campus police department. In some cases, these officers were detectives/investigators who investigated only crimes related to sexual assault or interpersonal violence. Larger universities with greater human resources have such programs. Smaller campuses have an established unit, but the officers weren’t necessarily detectives. In all cases these officers were highly trained in the trauma-informed, victim-centered approach to conducting sexual assault and interpersonal violence investigations. For the purpose of this report three different types of programs are highlighted because of their different approaches.

Michigan State University Police Special Victims Unit

One of the larger programs identified was at Michigan State University (“MSU”). MSU Police Department is one of the larger police organizations reviewed for this report. They have a full time Investigative Unit, and SVU is a component of investigations. The program is described as:

The SVU is committed to ensuring that all survivors are treated with courtesy, sensitivity, dignity, understanding, and professionalism. The detectives assigned to the SVU have received specialized training in trauma-informed interviewing, including the neurobiology of trauma. By understanding how trauma affects victims, officers can provide an experience that supports victims’ healing and recovery without re-traumatizing the victim. Detectives utilize a soft interview room, located at the MSU Police
Department, to interview survivors in a safe and supportive environment. The SVU investigates the following crimes:

- Sex Crimes
- Relationship Violence
- Stalking and Harassment
- Child Abuse
- Vulnerable Adult Abuse
- Missing Persons

The MSU Police Department recognizes that a strong community response will have the greatest change in the life of an individual victim. The Special Victims Unit works with community partners to continuously address the needs of victims and assist them with resources locally available. Officers also participate in community outreach programs and provide training to improve the safety of our community and encourage reporting.¹

In addition to the SVU, within the Investigations Bureau is a Behavioral Threat Assessment Unit (“BTAT”). Two full time detectives are assigned to this unit and in a stalking case an additional detective would be assigned the case to conduct a threat assessment using their specialized training and skills. As needed cases are referred to the MSU BTAT.

Another component of their program is the community Sexual Assault Response Team (“SART”). MSU police participate in the community-based SART, which sometimes conducts case reviews.

Most interesting about MSU is that they have an on-campus shelter for victims of relationship violence. Andrea Munford, Lieutenant, Training Coordinator Center for Trauma informed Investigative Excellence, indicated MSU may be the only university in the country with such a program. Having a shelter allows the SVU detectives to immediately move a student and then proceed with the investigation and restraining orders as needed.

Some of the key takeaways include training for supervisors, field training officers, patrol officers, and detectives; connecting students with resources, and have excellent relationships with the community service providers. Moreover, MSU stressed the importance of having an effective policy and protocols on relationship violence.

MSU police also conduct a lethality assessment. This is a critical procedure for interpersonal violence cases. Lethality assessments are covered in a separate section in this report.

¹ Michigan State University Police Department web page: https://police.msu.edu/police-services/investigations/
University of Connecticut Police Department Special Victims Unit

The University of Connecticut Police Department also has an SVU but unlike MSU police, UConn’s officers are assigned to both the detective bureau and uniform patrol. UConn’s police force isn’t as large as MSU’s. In order to provide an effective service to survivors, street officers are trained in the trauma-informed response and are considered SVU officers. The SVU officers are dispatched to calls while on general patrol. In addition, UConn police assign an SVU Coordinator (ranking officer) who is charged with reviewing cases and communicating with outside agencies as needed.

Yale University Sensitive Crime Coordinator

Yale University has a Sensitive Crimes Coordinator; currently a sergeant serves in this role. The Yale program is somewhat different than an SVU. In Yale’s police department the Sensitive Crimes Coordinator doesn’t investigate the crimes but may sit in on interviews. Their role is to review cases, ensure the student is connected to appropriate resources, and may work directly with the student in conducting safety plans, including connecting them to a safe house.

Of the colleges and universities that were surveyed for this report, most had implemented an SVU in the police department as full-time investigators. However, Yale and UConn demonstrate a unique approach if the police department resources are more limited. Another important point is that if you create a specific program within the police department, it’s best to seek officers who are committed to/volunteer for the work. In addition, several experts mentioned the need for monitor officers for stress and potential burn-out.

Victim Advocates

Several university police departments surveyed had victim advocates on their campuses. There appears to be three models: the advocates were employees working directly for the police department; they were employees of another department on campus but worked directly out of the police department; and they worked entirely separately from the police. Each model has its unique benefits and all are discussed in more detail below.

University of Florida

The University of Florida employs three full time victim advocates in the police department and the unit is referred to as the Office of Victims. Their role is to review cases, conduct campus-wide education and prevention programs, and serve as confidential advocates for victims of crimes. They may support a student through a SANE exam, sit through an interview to offer support, and ensure that any victim of a crime is empowered while they go through the criminal justice process. The program is described as follows:

The Office of Victim Services was developed in September of 1993 by the University of Florida Police Department to provide a civilian support person for anyone who may become a victim of crime while on the University of Florida campus. A victim advocate is available 24 hours a day, seven days a week to provide support for victims of actual or threatened violence. All services are free and confidential.
The Office of Victim Services is here to ensure that victims of crime receive fair treatment in accordance with the provisions of Florida State Statute 960.

The victim advocate will accompany and support victims through all stages of the criminal justice process such as law enforcement interviews, line-ups, testimony, deposition, trial, sentencing, injunction hearings, etc.

The victim advocate also provides emotional support while a victim experiences the initial issues and feelings oftentimes encountered by crime victims.

The victim advocate can also assist with referrals for counseling and other services that may be required.

Most importantly, victims may use the services of an advocate even if they decide to not officially report the crime to a law enforcement agency.²

The University of Massachusetts Amherst

The University of Massachusetts Amherst has two victim advocates who work for the Center for Women and Community ("CWC"). These confidential advocates, although employees of the CWC, work directly in the police departments. What's also unique about this program is the advocates share their time with the university police and four other local police departments. Under Massachusetts General Law they are confidential advocates and are required to report their cases to other campus departments. Interestingly, they have full access to all five police departments’ police reports. They did have to complete the state-required criminal history record information training prior to being given access to the reports. Officers are encouraged to forward police reports to them directly but they also check the records and police reports on a daily basis. One of the things the advocates look at when reviewing reports is potential miscoding, for example, if a report been coded “harassment” when it’s actually “stalking.”

UMass’s advocates are funded by a grant through the Department of Justice Violence Against Women. The grant pays the advocates’ salaries, and covers costs for officer training and officer overtime at each of the five communities involved. Beck Lockwood, the Director of CWC, also indicated UMass police are piloting a newly implemented dangerousness assessment form for interpersonal violence cases. Dangerousness assessments are covered in more detail below.

The University of Connecticut

The University of Connecticut takes a different approach to their victim advocate services and place the advocate within the Dean of Students Office. This is a non-confidential advocate who assists all victims of crime, much like the other schools. The advocate also serves on the Title IX Committee and the student care team, and often interacts with the UConn police.

Most of the colleges and universities surveyed place in the victim advocate within the police department. Of the few that do not, they cited a desire of the advocate to be impartial and to avoid the perception of victims that they had to report these crimes to the police.

² University of Florida Office of Victims: https://police.ufl.edu/about/divisions/office-of-victim-services/
Prevention and Awareness Programs

Colleges and universities have a host of federal regulations they must comply with, and when it comes to campus safety the most significant regulations are known as the Clery Act. In 2014 the Act was amended to, among other things, require colleges and universities to provide prevention and awareness programs for new employees and students. In addition, colleges and universities are now required to report an expanded list of crimes, including stalking. Meeting the requirements must be documented in the Annual Security Report required under the Clery Act.

There are thousands of colleges and universities across the country meeting these requirements each academic year. However, the University of Iowa has conducted a model program on Stalking Awareness. They have created a comprehensive Anti-Violence Coalition, which is a multidisciplinary team focused on ensuring a coordinated community response to prevention and intervention of sexual misconduct, dating/domestic violence, and stalking. Monique DiCarlo is the Sexual Misconduct and Response Coordinator and was interviewed for this report. She indicated the University received a series of grants through the Office of Violence Against Women beginning in 2006. You can review the history of their program here: https://osmrc.uiowa.edu/anti-violence-coalition/history

In 2014, they received another grant and as a result they revamped policies and enhanced their educational programs. In addition, all officers of the UI Police Department receive eight hours of training on sexual assault and stalking.

The University has also conducted an extensive public awareness campaign specifically targeting stalking, called “Stalking: Know It. Name It. Stop It.” This is an awareness campaign launched by the University of Iowa Anti-Violence Coalition in collaboration with a number of stakeholders, running January through mid-February.

![STALKING: KNOW IT. NAME IT. STOP IT.](image)

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4 The University of Iowa: https://now.uiowa.edu/2014/01/stalking-know-it-name-it-stop-it
Another important part of their overall program was conducting a student survey on stalking and producing a report that can be found here:

https://endingviolence.uiowa.edu/assets/Uploads/c3eeea72f/Stalking-Awareness-Campaign-Report.pdf

The University of Iowa Anti-Violence Coalition continues its work today with a focus on training, prevention, and intervention and provides a wealth of information for other colleges and universities seeking to address interpersonal violence on their campus.

Information about the trauma-informed approach to law enforcement first response:

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gtWD1XJrhNo&list=PLvW0o0Tbthi6jks69q1G1exfy5sXulGj7

https://outlook.office.com/owa/?path=/attachmentlightbox [this requires a password to get in]

Policy

Every state has laws prohibiting domestic violence and stalking. Colleges and universities also have separate behavioral standards that prohibit these behaviors. But it is equally important for colleges and universities to have an effective policy to guide their response to the specific issues facing stalking, its victims, and its offenders.

The National Center for Victims of Crimes has within it a Stalking Resource Center. The Center offers a wide variety of services to colleges and universities as well as law enforcement. Of particular interest is the recommendations offered within its model policy found here:


The Stalking Resource Center identified the following benefits in having a separate campus stalking policy:

- Identifies the problem-enhanced awareness
- Ensures consistency in following state statutes
- Encourages better victim sensitivity, protection, and response

The Center also identifies the essential information to be included in a campus policy:

- Statement of purpose
- Definition of stalking
- Jurisdiction
- List of stalking behaviors
- Reporting procedures
- Safety accommodations for victims

As mentioned earlier in this report, the University of Iowa received a grant through the OVM to revamp their policies. The UI policy is a good model to use as a guide for other campuses as they think about rewriting their own. It can be found here:
Most of campus policies reviewed for this report have followed the guidelines outlined by the Stalking Resource Center. Some had all-encompassing policies but still adhered to these core elements when addressing stalking within the policy.

Along with a campus policy, it is equally important to have an effective police department policy and procedure on interpersonal violence. The police departments contacted for this research were reluctant to share their department policy on interpersonal violence response. However, the University of Massachusetts Amherst did share how the dangerous assessment is outlined in their policy:

Officers should gather information regarding suspects past behavior and "dangerousness." This information should be documented in an incident report and provided to the Bail Commissioner in determination of bail and to the Prosecutor for use at arraignment. "Dangerousness" and associated requirements and hearings are contained in MGL c. 276, § 58A, available at:


Therefore, officers need to gather information regarding the suspect’s:

Criminal history, including history of abusing current victim, other victims, non-fatal strangulations, forced sex, extreme possessiveness or jealousy, possession and/or use or threat of weapons, abuse or threat of abuse of pets, attempts or threats to kill, attempts or threats to commit suicide.

Also include current or past vacate, restraining, no-contact or other protective orders, including those held against the suspect by someone other than this victim. After ascertaining past reported and non-reported criminal history, seek appropriate criminal action for current and prior incidents.

As mentioned previously, inclusion of the dangerousness assessment within the police department policy is important. The UMass policy provides a good reference. In addition, the information provided within the Stalking Resource Center can be used as an effective guideline in crafting a police policy and procedure. The International Association of Chiefs of Police also can provide support.

http://www.theiACP.org/resources/policy-center-resource/stalking

Training
An effective training program covering interpersonal violence is essential for all colleges and universities. Along with training law enforcement, campus administrators should also be trained, especially BIT, student care teams, conduct officers, Title IX and deputy Title IX officers, the dean of students, and advisors. One of the things the University of Iowa learned through experience was that police officers were best trained by police officers.

Training programs vary across the country. Law enforcement should rely on their P.O.S.T. trainers to ensure they are meeting the requirements of state law, but in addition to P.O.S.T. training, it is
important officers receive additional training. In conducting this research IACLEA heard consistently that training officers in a victim-centered approach, understanding the neurobiology of trauma, was needed to develop a foundation for understanding the victim. All the officers within the organization should be trained on these issues as well as interpersonal violence.

Some of the consistent training identified by those surveyed included the resources available at IACLEA and the IACP:

IACLEA Sexual Assault: A Trauma Informed Response April 16, 2019 South West Tennessee Community College, Memphis Tennessee

IACLEA Sexual Assault: A Trauma Informed Response April 18, 2019 San Diego State University, San Diego California.

IACP offers the following trainings:

https://www.theiaccp.org/projects/trauma-informed-sexual-assault-investigation-training

Lexington, KY - January 9th & 10th, 2019: The IACP, in collaboration with the University of Kentucky Police Department, will hold the Trauma Informed Sexual Assault Investigation Training January 9th & 10th, 2019 in Lexington, KY. This event is free to attend. To register, please visit: https://leim.wufoo.com/forms/woo7ke0zpcfqv/

IACP also offers resource library for stalking:


The University of Iowa found Tom Trembley to be a very effective trainer, describing him as “shifting the culture.” His information is found here:


The University of Michigan also relies heavily on IACP and shared this PowerPoint as an example:

https://outlook.office.com/owa/?path=/attachmentlightbox

MSU also relies upon Dr. Rebecca Campbell to conduct training:

https://vaw.msu.edu/people/campbell/

In addition, MSU PD has used: A Trauma Informed Approach to Law Enforcement First Response

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gtWD1XrhN0o&list=PLvW0o0Tbthi6jks69qtG1exfy5xulGj7

Another important point mentioned by each institution interviewed was the inclusion of your local advocates and local resources as a tool to help train staff. They also stressed the approach that the training is continuous for all their staff.
Conclusion
Solving interpersonal violence on colleges and universities is a complex and difficult task, but though the programs, policies, and training programs outlined within this paper a campus can significantly enhance its efforts. As Lt. Munford from MSU points out, the successful indicators of a campus program are the three C’s: communication, coordination, and collaboration. In order to achieve success, as the University of Iowa, University of Massachusetts Amherst, and Michigan State University demonstrate, you must educate your students and community. Moreover, it’s important to coordinate your violence prevention and strategies with multiple constituents. Law enforcement cannot do this alone. The OVW grant programs offers funding and resources to grant awardees and can help colleges and universities improve their response to and strategies for interpersonal violence. Lastly, each expert interviewed for this report stressed the importance of the campuses’ sustained commitment to addressing interpersonal violence.